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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
v. 
RUSSELL CATALANO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
: Case No. 930678-CA 
: Priority: 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RESTITUTION AMOUNT 
BY NOT MAKING SUFFICIENT FINDINGS AS TO 
ACTUAL EXPENSES AND LOSSES WHICH WERE EASILY 
MEASURABLE AND PREDICTABLE 
In order to determine if the trial court's restitution order was proper, this court 
must first ascertain which damages can be appropriately entered at a restitution hearing. 
In the first case arising under the restitution law, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged 
the new law was "nearly identical to an Oregon statute from which it was patterned." 
Utah v. Depaoli. 835 P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme 
Court relied on Oregon case law to help determine "who is entitled to restitution and 
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what types of expenses qualify for restitution . . . ." Id. (citations omitted).1 Reference 
to Oregon law is helpful in the case at bar. 
The Utah Supreme Court has agreed with the Oregon Supreme Court that damages 
available at a restitution hearing are only those that "would otherwise be special damages 
recoverable in a civil proceeding/ kL; Oregon v. Dillon. 637 P.2d 602, 607 (1981). 
The Oregon Court has further stated that restitutional damages apply "only to expenses 
actually incurred and to those expenses which are easily measurable . . . and . . . those 
future expenses reasonably predictable. Oregon v. Hart. 699 P.2d 1113, 1117-18 (1985). 
The analogous civil proceeding under Utah law would be damages for loss of 
work, wages or profits for a tortious act. Under civil standards, any losses tied to the 
defendant's behavior "may be recovered when the evidence submitted provides a basis for 
estimate them with reasonable certainty. While the evidence must not be so indefinite as 
to allow the [trier of fact] to speculate as to their amount, some degree of uncertainty is 
tolerable." Acculog. Inc. v. Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 732 (Utah 1984). The Utah 
Supreme Court has also stated that the evidence of damages must not be "so meager as to 
invite sheer speculation . . . ." Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors. Inc.. 593 P.2d 
1303, 1306 (1979). 
*The Utah Court of Appeals has also given deference to Oregon's case law concerning 
the restitution statute. In State v. Garcia. 866 P.2d 5 (1993), defendant was convicted of 
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance and ordered to pay restitution to a police 
agency. This court stated: "Our Oregon counterpart has already decided the exact issue 
presented by the facts of this case in State v. P e t t i t . . . . We agree with the Oregon court's 
conclusion in Pettit. Id. at 7. 
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The trial court in Mr. Catalano's case failed to adhere to these standards in 
accepting Mr. Valgardson and Mrs. Hernandez's guesses of lost time and profits from 
their respective businesses. Their opinions were speculation and should not have been 
relied upon in determining restitution costs. 
The trial court found that Mr. Valgardson had suffered a $3,000 loss to his 
business although he presented no evidence at the restitution hearing. (R.117 at 67). 
The court allowed Mr. Valgardson to estimate his losses although he acknowledged his 
estimates were MsubjectiveM and that he "couldn't really say, because [he]'d have to do a 
time and motion study to see" how the loss affected his business. (R.117 at 45). 
Mr. Valgardson testified at the restitution hearing that the missing paint sprayers 
slowed his business by backing up the assembly line process he used to build homes. 
(R.117 at 40-41). He estimated that he was probably working on eighteen to twenty-four 
houses at a cost of $23,000 a day for total operation costs in 1992. (R. 117 at 40). In 
response to the delays, Mr. Valgardson replaced one of the paint sprayers four or five 
days after the break-in and the other two sprayers within the next six weeks. (R. 117 at 
40). Moreover, the trial court awarded Mr. Valgardson "purchase price" restitution for 
paint-sprayers when his actual loss was paint-sprayers that were three to six years old. 
(R.117 at 34, 66) and in spite of testimony in regards to the actual market value of used 
paint-sprayers (R.117 at 27, 30, 64). None of these figures or facts were documented by 
Mr. Valgardson or the state. 
Mr. Catalano argues that the delays were not as great as Mr. Valgardson testified. 
Mr. Catalano testified that when he worked for Mr. Valgardson, often only one sprayer 
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was used on the assembly line at a time. (R.117 at 61-62). In those circumstances, the 
new paint sprayer obtained four or five days after the break-in could have eliminated all 
back-up or delay. Again, there was no evidence before the court of how the events 
actually affected Mr. Valgardson's business. He testified of how things worked 
hypothetically but gave no evidence about the specifics of that time period. Mr. 
Valgardson did not produce business receipts (even for the new sprayers (R.117 at 37-
38)), no work records of employee overtime, or documentation of lost or delayed orders. 
Any of these items would have informed the trial court of Mr. Valgardson's actual costs, 
not just the hypothetical costs. 
Similarly, Mrs. Hernandez testified that her husband's business suffered losses 
although she repeatedly said she Hfel[t] inadequate putting a dollar amount on how much 
[was] lost." (R.117 at 97.) The trial court allowed Mrs. Hernandez to speculate as to 
the amount her husband was paid for each job and how many jobs he lost during the time 
he did not have a paint sprayer. (R.117 at 96-97). Mrs. Hernandez did not produce any 
business records or receipts proving that business was lost, she simply restated what she 
was told by her husband. (R.117 at 96-97). 
Furthermore, the trial court made no inquiry into the costs for lost wages 
submitted by Mrs. Hernandez. The Utah Supreme Court has held that in seeking civil 
damages for loss of profits, a party is entitled to recover only net profits, not gross 
profits. Sawvers v. FMA Leasing Co.. 722 P.2d 773, 774 (1986). The court reasoned 
that "In addition to proof of gross profits, there must generally be supporting evidence of 
overhead expenses, or other costs of producing income from which a net figure can be 
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derived." IcL In Sawyers, the court found the plaintiffs could not recover the sought 
costs as they had failed to introduce "financial summaries, monthly sales volume 
breakdowns, costs of sales expenses, or any other overhead expenses, from which the 
trial court could reasonably have calculated plaintiffs lost net profit . . . ." kL at 775. 
Mr. Catalano argues that the civil damages analogy prohibits the trial court from 
accepting Mrs. Hernandez's estimated lost profits. There was no evidence of how much 
net profit her husband made on any of his painting jobs when supplies and other overhead 
costs were included. Mrs. Hernandez indicated her husband made "around $1,700 and 
$2,000" for each painting job. (R.117 at 97). Later when questioned by the court 
concerning whether this figure was gross or net profit, Mrs. Hernandez replied that her 
husband "would usually gross — or net about between 1,500 to 1,800." She clarified that 
the figure was not an income "every single month" and was "just an estimate." (R.117 at 
117). The court cannot properly assess a restitutionary amount from speculation. An 
itemized list of supplies and other costs needs to be submitted to provide a basis for 
estimating Mr. Hernandez's losses with reasonable certainty. See Acculog. Inc. v. 
Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 732 (Utah 1984). 
POINT n 
MR. CATALANO'S OBJECTIONS TO THE COURT'S DETERMINATIONS 
PRESERVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL 
The State argues that Mr. Catalano cannot appeal the trial court's failure to 
consider his financial resources when determining restitution. The state cites State v. 
Snyder. 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 1987) to support its contention. In Snyder, the defendant 
waived any challenge to the trial court's failure to enter written findings by not objecting 
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to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the ordered restitution. In the present case, 
the State represented to the trial court that it would seek full restitution and Mr. Catalano 
had agreed to pay this as part of the plea bargain. (R. 117 at 5-6.) Mr. Catalano did not 
object to this statement. However, throughout the restitution hearing, Mr. Catalano 
objected to the valuation for certain losses and the amount of restitution to particular 
witnesses. Concerning the restitution for Mr. Valgardson's machines, Mr. Catalano 
objected to the amount based on purchase price. (R. 117 at 68). Mr. Catalano also raised 
concern about the $3,000 given for down-time which the court itself said was a "generic 
approximate." (R.117 at 68). Later in the hearing, Mr. Catalano objected to a figure 
Mrs. Hernandez gave for a spray hose which was double the price offered by another 
witness, Mr. Jesperson. (R.117 at 105). Mrs. Hernandez's speculation concerning the 
income from each job was objected to because of its wild estimation without support 
(R.117 at 117). Although not objecting to the imposition of restitution, Mr. Catalano's 
objections to the court's calculations and valuations preserves his claim to appeal on these 
issues. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-3-20l(3)(b)(i) (1990) requires the trial court to 
consider the financial resources of the defendant in its determination as to the type of 
restitution to be imposed as well as the financial burden such restitution would create. 
The trial court failed to consider the financial resources of Mr. Catalano-who typically 
earned $6.00 per hour as a painter (R.117 at 50)--or the financial burden that a restitution 
award of such a speculative nature would cause him and his family. The trial court's 
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failure to make such considerations contravenes the plain meaning of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-3-201 (3)(b)(i) (1990). 
POINT m 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ARRIVING 
AT THE AMOUNT ORDERED AS RESTITUTION 
In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), Brown contested the trial court's 
order that he pay the county for his defense. The Utah Supreme Court held: "We will 
not set aside a sentence imposed by a trial court unless the sentence represents an abuse 
of discretion, the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors, or the sentence 
imposed exceeded the limits prescribed by law." IdLat861. See also State v. Twitchell. 
832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) ("Unless a trial court exceeds the authority 
prescribed by law or abuses its discretion, we will not disturb its order of restitution.") 
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to base the 
restitution amount on expenses which had actually incurred or were easily measurable. 
Mr. Valgardson's subjective estimate of $3,000 business loss was not reasonable because 
he had no documentation or proof. If Mr. Valgardson had conducted a time and motion 
study, the results could have been viewed by the court and used in finding an accurate 
restitution amount. Similarly, Mrs. Hernandez testified that she "would really feel 
inadequate putting a dollar amount on how much [she and her husband] lost." (R.117 at 
97). 
To allow Mr. Valgardson and Mrs. Hernandez to recover damages when their 
evidence is so indefinite as to allow speculation is abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
The evidence presented was contradicted by Mr. Catalano and Mr. Jesperson and was 
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neither reasonable nor satisfactory to reach the court's conclusions. See State In re 
Schroeder, 598 P.2d 373, 374 (Utah 1979) (Holding that the court's authority to order 
delinquent juvenile to make restitution extends only to damages which are shown by 
satisfactory evidence to have resulted from his wrongful conduct) (emphasis added). The 
trial court abused its discretion and the restitution granted was an improper measure of 
value. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Catalano respectfully requests the Court of 
Appeals find the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of restitution 
and order that a new restitution hearing be held to assess the proper amount of damages. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1994. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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